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HAVE EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES IN ASIA BECOME MORE FLEXIBLE 




There is a broad consensus that the soft US dollar pegs operated by a number of Asian 
countries prior to 1997 contributed to the regional financial crisis of 1997-98. There is, 
however, much less agreement on the types of exchange rate regimes operated by many 
Asian countries since the crisis. Can they still be characterized as soft US dollar pegs, or 
have they become genuinely more flexible? This paper revisits the evidence regarding 
the extent of exchange rate flexibility in the five Asian countries (Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) using alternative methodologies and data 
spanning the pre- and post-crisis time period. Given the diversity of measures of de facto 
regimes in the literature, the use of alternative methodologies in this paper is critical as a 
means of obtaining an accurate and robust indication of the type of exchange rate regime 
operated by a country. 
 
 
Keywords:  Asia, exchange rate regime, inflation targeting, interest rates, reserves, 
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1.   Introduction 
There is a broad consensus that the soft US dollar pegs operated by a number of 
Asian countries prior to 1997 contributed to the regional financial crisis of 1997-98. 
There is, however, much less agreement on the types of exchange rate regimes operated 
by many Asian countries since the crisis. To be sure, among the crisis-hit countries, the 
Malaysian ringgit has been unambiguously fixed to the US dollar (at 3.80 Malaysian 
Ringgit per US dollar) since September 1998. In contrast, the four other crisis-hit 
countries, viz. Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand, officially proclaimed to 
have floated their exchange rates while adopting a monetary policy strategy based on 
inflation targeting (see Table 1 and Cavoli and Rajan, 2005).  
There is a burgeoning literature documenting that there can be a significant 
divergence between de facto and de jure exchange rate policies and regimes. Just how 
flexible have exchange rates in Asia become post crisis? Can they still be characterized 
as soft US dollar pegs as suggested by Calvo and Reinhart (2002), Fukuda (2002) and 
McKinnon (2001), or have they become genuinely more flexible as suggested by Baig 
(2001), Hernández and Montiel (2001), Kawai (2002), and others
1.  
At a first glance, Figure 1 reveals that exchange rates do indeed appear to have 
become more flexible in recent years for all the countries except Malaysia. Even if the 
Asian currencies have become more flexible, what form has the flexibility taken, i.e. free 
floating, managed floating, basket pegging, etc? The extent and form of flexibility of 
Asian currencies post crisis is not solely of academic interest, being directly related to 
                                                 
1 Of course, apart from differences in methodologies and estimating techniques, divergences in 
results could be because of different time periods and frequency of data used (daily, monthly or 
quarterly). 
   4
the ongoing debate on the need for global macroeconomic adjustments and the manner 
in which such adjustments are to be attained (Rajan, 2004, 2005).  
This paper revisits the evidence regarding the extent of exchange rate flexibility 
in the five Asian countries post crisis using alternative methodologies and data up to mid 
2004. Different measures of de facto regimes inevitably capture different characteristics 
of any regime.  As such, using a number of methodologies is critical as a robustness 
exercise – the existence of similar results from alternative methods allows us to form 
conclusions about exchange rate regimes with significantly greater confidence than if 
only one method was employed.  
An important caveat is in order before proceeding. There are a number of recent 
papers on the topic of de facto regime classification -- for instance, see Bénassy-Quéré 
et al. (2004), Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002, 2003), Frankel et al. (2001), Calvo and 
Reinhart (2002), Kim (2003), Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002), Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2002) and Shambaugh (2004).  This paper does not concern itself with the 
methodology of actually classifying exchange rate regimes, but instead concentrates on 
detecting possible regime changes in the five Asian countries pre and post crisis.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the de 
facto regimes by investigating the unconditional volatilities of exchange rates, interest 
rates and international reserves using monthly data for the period January 1990 to July 
2004. It also conducts more formal tests to ascertain the degree of exchange rate 
flexibility and the extent of intervention employed to control the volatility of the 
currency for the same period.  The focus is on the difference in the variability of 
exchange rates, interest rates and international reserves in each Asian country pre and 
post crisis, as well as between the Asian countries and noted ‘floaters’ (Australia, New   5
Zealand, Canada, UK and USA) post crisis
2. Section 3 computes a set of exchange 
market pressure (EMP) indices to provide a summary measure of the degree of 
flexibility (or inversely, the degree of intervention). Section 4 presents more formal tests 
on the extent to which each of the currencies examined have been pegged to the US 
dollar and to the Japanese yen using a useful extension of the methodology pioneered by 
Frankel and Wei (1994). Section 5 offers a summary and some concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Pre and Post Crisis Behaviour of Exchange Rates, Interest Rates and 
Reserves 
 
We attempt to do two things in this section. One, we investigate the behaviour 
of exchange rates, interest rates and reserves for the crisis-affected countries using 
monthly data for the period 1990 to 2004. The nexus between the volatilities of 
exchange rates, interest rates and reserves is important from a policy perspective in that 
it offers insight into whether central banks used interest rates or reserves to manage 
currency movements. Two, in order to assist with the comparison, we split the sample 
into the pre crisis and post crisis sub-samples. The volatilities of exchange rates, interest 
rates and reserves for the pre and post crisis samples are compared for each country and 
between the crisis-hit countries and the known ‘floaters’ of Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada, UK and USA (as defined by Calvo and Reinhart, 2002).  
 
2.1  Standard Deviations of Exchange Rates, Interest Rates and Reserves 
                                                 
2 The monthly data are from the IMF-IFS CD and from the ADB-ARIC database from January 
1990 to June 2004. Exchange rates per US dollar are taken from line RF of IFS, exchange rates 
per yen are calculated from the US/yen rate, and real effective exchange rate (REERs) are 
from the ADB-ARIC database. Reserves data are taken from lines 11, 14 and 16c of IFS, and 
interest rates are taken from line 60B of IFS. 
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  Figures 2a to 2c present annual (calendar year) standard deviations of monthly 
percentage changes in exchange rates for the crisis-affected countries
3.  
  The extreme volatility of the exchange rates during the crisis of 1997-98 
notwithstanding, the exchange rate volatilities in Korea, Thailand and Indonesia are 
significantly higher in the post crisis period, while there is no volatility of the ringgit 
against the US dollar, as would be expected (Figure 1). The differences in variability for 
the Philippines seem economically insignificant when eyeballing the data. Exchange rate 
volatility of the regional currencies against the yen does not appear to have increased 
discernibly pre and post crisis, except possibly for Indonesia (Figure 2b). The results for 
the real effective exchange rates (REERs) show similar but not as marked differences 
between the two periods compared to the volatilities of local currencies per US dollars 
(Figure 2c). Overall, the exchange rate volatilities offer some indicative initial evidence 
to support the claim that exchange rate regimes in Korea, the Philippines and Thailand 
have become more flexible post crisis.    
It well known that unconditional exchange rate volatility alone cannot adequately 
describe the currency regime adopted by a country. This is because central banks could 
use interest rates and reserves as policy instruments to help actively manage or influence 
currency movements. Accordingly, in order to present a more complete account of the 
possible change of regime (i.e. degree of conditional exchange rate flexibility), the 
volatilities of interest rates and reserves must also be taken into account. Specifically, a 
regime considered to be less flexible will have relatively low exchange rate volatility, 
ceteris paribus
4. If, in the event of relatively low exchange rate volatility and where 
                                                 
3 The standard deviations for 2004 are for the first half of the year (January to June).  
 
4 The ceteris paribus condition is, of course, critical as the implicit assumption is that there is no 
substantive change in the external environment. In order for a full analysis to be undertaken we   7
reserve volatility is high but interest rate volatility is low, then it might be posited that 
reserves are the primary policy instrument (i.e. exchange rate intervention). If reserve 
volatility is low but interest rate volatility is high, then plausibly, interest rates might be 
the primary instrument for stabilizing the currency (Reinhart, 2000)
5.  
Figure 3 examines the money market interest rates in annual standard deviation 
of monthly first differences. As is apparent, interest rates are clearly less volatile after 
the crisis, particularly for Korea, Thailand and the Philippines
6. 
    Figure 4 shows the annual standard deviations of the monthly deviation of 
foreign reserves (net foreign assets) from it Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trend.  This is, in 
turn, scaled by lagged base money.  This adjustment for trend is made to remove the 
effects of possible reserve accumulation by central banks that do not specifically related 
to day-to-day exchange rate management.  Specifically, we know that Korea and other 
Asian countries (except the Philippines) have been accumulating reserves since 1998, a 
reflection of the fact that the currencies have been undervalued (Kim et al., 2004 and 
Hernández and Montiel, 2001). However, we are principally interested here in the 
management of volatility as opposed to management of the value of the exchange rate. 
In addition, reserves are scaled by lagged domestic monetary base in order to compare 
the magnitude of the reserve change in relation to the stock of money base in the system. 
Since reserves are used to alter relative monies, scaling the change in reserves offers 
                                                                                                                                             
would need to estimate a monetary model or a related model that is able to capture the external 
factors that might have an impact on the exchange rate. The problems with fundamentals-based 
models of exchange rates are well known and do not need to be repeated here. Also see Willett 
(2004) for a useful discussion of the issue of trends versus volatilities when attempting to 
decipher exchange rate behaviour. 
 
5 We are abstracting here from issues relating to sterilization of reserve intervention. 
 
6 Money market rates (IFS line 60B) are used as they appear to adequately represent the policy 
rate and offer sufficient volatility for the purposes of analysis.     8
some information about the proportion of the money base that is being used for 
intervention. From Figure 4, it can be seen that the differences in reserve volatility 
between the pre and post crisis periods are not easily detectable for most countries. 
Korea is a notable exception where it seems that reserves volatility has increased 
significantly post crisis (also see Willett, 2004).  There is also evidence to suggest that 
reserve volatility for Indonesia may have diminished after the crisis. 
  Comparing Figures 2a and 2c, it can be seen, at least for the local currency per 
US dollar and the REERs, that exchange rate volatility is higher post crisis, and that 
interest rates have become less volatile. The implication regarding the volatility of 
reserves is harder to categorically determine. The conclusion is that the exchange rate 
regimes for Korea, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines have become more flexible 
post crisis. The reverse is true for Malaysia. However, this conclusion is clouded 
somewhat by the volatility of reserves, where there is little evidence to support a 
conclusion of increased flexibility. In fact, Korea seems to be using reserves more 
aggressively after the crisis than before, while the volatility of international reserves does 




2.2  Pre versus Post crisis Volatilities and Comparison with Known Floaters       
  Table 2 presents the standard deviations of exchange rates, interest rates and 
reserve changes as before for the five Asian countries and for the known floaters for the 
pre and post crisis sample periods. We define the pre crisis sample as spanning the 
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period 1990:1 to 1997:3, while the post crisis sample period is 1999:6 to 2004:6
7. We 
aim to do two things here. First, we compare the relative volatilities in a single country 
over the two sample periods. Second, we compare the post crisis samples of the five 
Asian countries with the known floaters. 
A comparison of each sample confirms the conclusions of the previous section. 
Irrespective of how the exchange rate is expressed (i.e. vis-à-vis the US dollar, yen or 
REER), its volatility after the crisis increased for Korea, Thailand and Indonesia, 
decreased for Malaysia, and remained more-or-less stable (with a bias to a slight 
decrease) in the Philippines. Correspondingly, interest rate and reserve volatility 
decreased after the crisis for the most part, although there are a few important 
exceptions. The first relates to interest rates in Indonesia. Unlike in the other countries, 
they have become more variable after the crisis. Along with a post crisis reduction in 
reserve volatility, this suggests that interest rates are possibly used more frequently as a 
policy instrument
8. The second exception is the increase in reserve volatility in Korea. Is 
this an indication of some desire to continue to use reserves as an exchange rate 
management tool?  
  As in Baig (2001) and Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and others, we compare the 
post crisis volatilities for the Asian countries and the known floaters. For the most part 
the exchange rate variation is lower for those countries in the Asian sample than for the 
                                                 
7 Thus, we define the crisis period as being between 1997:4 and 1999:5. There is, admittedly, a 
degree of ad-hocism in the choice of these periods. For instance, Hernández and Montiel (2001) 
Taguchi (2004) take the post crisis period to be 1991:1. Our choice of 1999:5 as being the end of 
the crisis is derived from simple robustness tests -- we found that, by and large, the post crisis 
results were reasonably robust as we kept working backwards from the end of the sample and 
expanding the sample size until 1999:6, beyond which the results began to change (quite 
significantly in some cases).   
 
8 Of course, it could also be that the market risk element of interest rates (i.e. risk premium) has 
become more volatile as well.    10
floaters. The interest rate volatility in the floaters is also lower, suggesting that they are 
less inclined to intervene using interest rate policy. (Interest rate smoothing appears to 
be a more important objective among industrial countries). With regard to the volatility 
of reserves, it appears that New Zealand is an outlier here, and that the floaters possess 
less variation in reserves
9.  
Thus, the simple analysis undertaken thus far leads to the conclusion that, with 
the exception of Malaysia, the Asian countries have moved towards more flexible 
exchange rates. However, the Asian currencies are clearly far less flexible than the 
known floaters, suggesting some degree of continued market intervention to stabilize the 
exchange rate
10. Results of this nature have led many to hypothesize about a possible 
“Fear of Floating” in some emerging market economies (for instance, see Baig, 2001 





3.  Exchange Market Pressure (EMP) Indices  
3.1  Defining the Indices 
  As discussed, it is important to simultaneously consider the three variables (viz. 
exchange rates, interest rates and reserve changes) to obtain a proper perspective on the 
                                                                                                                                             
 
9 New Zealand is an interesting case is that it has not chosen to hold its own reserves, the bulk of 
its reserves having been borrowed. However, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) has 
recently taken steps to bolster its capacity to intervene in the foreign exchange market to 
influence the level of the New Zealand dollar in certain circumstances. 
 
10 Of course, it could also be that the floaters are faced with a different set of shocks to the Asian 
countries.     11
extent of exchange rate flexibility (or inversely, the extent of intervention). One way of 
incorporating all these variables would be to compute an exchange rate pressure (EMP) 
index. This section presents two sets of simple EMP indices based on Baig (2001), 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998), Glick and Wihlborg (1997) and Calvo and Reinhart 
(2002): 
 
Index 1 = σER/(σER+σNFA)         (1)  
Index 2 = σER/(σER+σNFA+ σIR)         ( 2 )  
 
where σER is the annual standard deviation of monthly (log) percentage difference in the 
exchange rate, σIR is the annual standard deviation of monthly first differences in money 
market rates, and σNFA is the annual standard deviation of the monthly deviation of   
reserves from its HP trend (and scaled by lagged Money Base). All standard deviations 
are calculated as in the previous sections.     
  While there are a number of different types of EMP indices (for instance, see 
Guimãeres and Karacadag, 2004), the particular set of indices were chosen because they 
are easily aligned with the discussion of the previous section about the role of interest 
rates and/or reserves as policy instruments. For instance, a low index value in this 
instance may imply less exchange rate flexibility or a higher level of intervention. Other 
things being equal, higher reserve volatility will reduce the index value, possibly 
suggesting that reserves are being employed as a monetary policy tool in order to limit 
exchange rate flexibility. 
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  Index 1 measures the possible effects of reserve intervention but ignores the 
effects of interest rates. Baig (2001) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998) are primarily 
concerned with this type of index as interest rate movements contain market as well as 
policy determinants
11. While this is true, the same can be said of reserves data – which 
are not cleansed of currency valuation changes
12. It may be worth evaluating the effects 
of interest rate based intervention in light of the move by some Asian central banks 
towards inflation targeting and the use of interest rate rules (Cavoli and Rajan, 2005). 
Hence, Index 2 is a generalized index capturing both reserve and interest rate 
intervention. By construction, each index presents values bounded by 0 and 1, and the 
weights attributable to each variable in the denominator of the index are equal.
13  
 
3.1  Interpreting the Results 
As in the previous section, three measures of the exchange rate are used, viz. 
local against the US dollar, the yen, and the REER. The results are presented in Figures 
5 and 6. Figures 5a to 5c show Index 1 for the US dollar, yen and REER, respectively. 
Figures 6a to 6c show Index 2 for the US dollar, yen and REER, respectively  
Focussing on Index 1, an examination of Figures 5a to 5c tends to confirm that, 
pre-crisis, there was a greater inclination on the part of central banks to intervene in the 
                                                 
11 Willett (2004) uses a measure referred to as the “intervention index”, which is merely 1- Index 
1, i.e. σNFA/(σER+σNFA).    
 
12 Cleansing the data to focus only on reserves change due to policy intervention rather than 
valuation changes is not possible as most countries do not provide data on the currency 
composition of reserves. 
 
13 The calculation of weights in indices of this type is a critical feature of the literature on EMP. 
In some cases theory is used as the basis for determining the weights (for instance, see Girton 
and Roper, 1977), while in other cases, empirical methods are employed to select the weights 
(for instance, Pentecost et al,, 2001 make use of principal components analysis). 
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market against the US dollar, most so in the case of Indonesia and Thailand. Both these 
countries appear to have become fairly flexible post crisis as evidenced by the rise in 
their respective EMPs, especially vis-à-vis the US dollar. Less obvious results are 
obtained in the case of the Philippines, while the Malaysian ringgit has become 
completely inflexible vis-à-vis the US dollar. Somewhat surprisingly, after a period of 
some flexibility, the Korean won appears to be becoming less flexible against the US 
dollar.  
Looking at the local currency per yen, pre crisis the regional currencies appeared 
to have been fairly flexible vis-à-vis the yen. This suggests that local central banks 
allowed their currencies values relative to the yen to be determined by the yen/US rate, 
so–called “third currency phenomenon”. Thus, prior to 1997, if regional countries had 
given greater weight to the yen in their baskets pre crisis, there would have been lower 
degrees of regional real exchange rate overvaluations following the nearly 50 percent 
nominal appreciation of the US dollar relative to the yen between June 1995 to April 
1997 (which in turn led to a rise in the value of the regional currencies relative to the 
yen) (Bird and Rajan, 2002 and Rajan, 2002). Post crisis, while there does not appear to 
be any discernible change in the degree of flexibility of the Indonesian rupiah, the 
Philippine peso, the Thai baht and the Malaysia ringgit vis-à-vis the yen post crisis, while 
the Korean won has become relatively less flexible vis-à-vis the yen post crisis
14.  
Based on the foregoing analysis, as would be expected, while the Thai baht has 
become more flexible in REER terms, the won seems to have become less so. Indeed, 
comparing Figures 5a, 5b and 5c, it is apparent that while the EMP of the Korean won 
vis-à-vis the US dollar was lower than the yen or the REER pre crisis, post crisis its 
                                                 
14 Oh (2004) also finds that the Korean won has displayed increasing co-movements with the yen 
post crisis.   14
EMP vis-à-vis the REER was equivalently low for all three. This suggests that while the 
won may have been heavily managed relative to the US dollar prior to the crisis, there is 
some evidence to suggest it has become more managed relative to a basket (involving 
the yen and US dollar), such that the won’s REER is relatively stable.  
  How robust are these results? If one examines Figures 6a to 6c (using Index 2), 
we reach the same conclusion that the regional currencies with the exception of the 
Malaysian ringgit have become more flexible vis-à-vis the US dollar post crisis. As 
discussed above, the Korean won appears to be reverting to a soft dollar peg. 
Interestingly, however, the further conclusion that the won may be more heavily pegged 
to the REER than the US dollar post crisis no longer holds. The reason for this is the 
rise in the Korean won’s EMP post crisis relative to the yen compared to the previous 
conclusion of a decline (compare Figure 5b and 6b). However, the finding that the Thai 
baht has become relatively more flexible in general (relative to the US dollar, the yen 
and in REER terms) continues to hold.  
         
 
 
4.  Extent of Influence of the US Dollar and the Yen in Asian Currencies 
 
  One of the main results from the previous two sections is that the extent of 
intervention in the US dollar has decreased for the most part, but there appears to be 
evidence supporting a reversion to a US dollar peg in some instances, particularly in the 
case of Korea. However, there is some degree of uncertainty as to whether the Korean 
won is following (pegged to?) the yen more closely post crisis. This section presents two 
sets of formal tests (OLS and Kalman Filter based estimates) to ascertain the degree to 
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which local currencies have been and continue to be influenced by the US dollar and by 
the yen  
 
4.1  Influence of the US Dollar and Yen – Time Invariant Results 
The first set of tests is based on the well-known work by Frankel and Wei 
(1994). The method essentially involves conducting an OLS test of the local currency on 
other currencies that are considered to influence the former. Each currency is expressed 
in terms of an ‘independent’ numeraire. The equation examined is as follows: 
 
ERt = β0 + β1USt + β2JPt + μt     ( 3 )  
 
where ER refers to the local currency. All currencies are expressed in log differences and 
the numeraire currency used is the Swiss franc. As with the empirical results in the 
previous section, the pre crisis sample is 1990:1 to 1997:3 and the post crisis sample is 
1999:6 to 2004:6. 
  Table 3 presents the pre and post crisis values of β1 and β2 for Korea, Thailand, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines
15. Only the pre crisis regressions are presented for 
Malaysia given the country’s stated post crisis rigid fix to the US dollar. The coefficient 
values are interpreted as the degree of influence of the US dollar and yen, respectively, 
on the local currency. A larger β value is suggestive of a high degree of influence of the 
US dollar, and hence possible intervention in the market for that currency. This said, it is 
important to note that a large positive and significant coefficient on β1 does necessarily 
imply strong US dollar pegs. As Hernández and Montiel (2001) note “(such) results are 
                                                 
15 When interpreting the significance levels of the coefficient estimates it is important to be aware 
of the possible existence of multicollinearity in models of this type.    16
consistent either with a tight peg against the U.S. dollar…or with a much looser 
currency link to the dollar combined with tight economic links to the dollar area and a 
relative absence of independent shocks during the sample period”. 
The results based on the simple OLS in Table 3 reveal that the value of β1 has 
fallen after the crisis. By and large, this validates the results from the previous sections in 
that the degree of flexibility against the US dollar has increased after the crisis. Not only 
has the value fallen, but the level of significance has declined as well, possibly an 
indication of a reduction in the tightness of the peg to the US dollar. Also noteworthy is 
the increase in the degree of influence of the yen after the crisis. This is noticeable 
across-the-board. It should be noted though that the significance levels are lower for the 
yen than for the US dollar. This is broadly consistent with the results in Section 3, 
whereby the EMPs of the currencies using the US dollar have generally risen post crisis 
and have fallen relative to the yen, but the former still exceeds the latter. 
 
4.2  Influence of the US Dollar and Yen – Time Varying coefficients 
The relative degree of significance between the US dollar and the yen can be 
explored further by applying the Kalman Filter to the regressions
16. Such regressions 
allow for the coefficient’s evolution to be tracked over the entire sample. The model 
used is as follows: 
     
ERt = β0 + β1tUSt + β2tJPt + μt       ( 3 )  
                                                                                                                                             
 
16 Essentially, it is an algorithm that calculates the linear least squares of the state vector (β) 
given all available data at that point in time.  The state vector and its mean squared error are 
estimated recursively and each estimation is used to obtain the time varying parameters sought in 
our tests.  See Cuthbertson et al. (1992) for a discussion of Kalman Filter methods in an 
exchange rate determination model.     17
β1t = β1t-1 + ε1t             ( 4 )  
β2t = β2t-1 + ε 2t             ( 5 )  
 
Equation (3) once again describes the measurement equation of the system, but each 
coefficient is assumed to vary over time, the evolution of which is given by Equations 
(4) and (5). This particular simple version of the Kalman Filter method applies a 
recursive algorithm to estimate the value of each β at each iteration. The result is that 
the evolution of each β can be examined for the pre crisis and post crisis periods without 
the need to split the sample
17.  
One of the advantages of the Kalman Filter technique over the simple Frankel-
Wei OLS tests is that the volatility of a coefficient can be observed over time. This may 
offer us greater insight into central bank behaviour. A smooth time path of the 
coefficient might imply that the central bank intervenes to maintain the influence of one 
currency over the other. A high but erratic coefficient value possibly implies a strong 
correlation that is not necessarily brought about by central bank behaviour. Rather, it 
could imply a strong correlation that occurs naturally in the market for that particular 
currency pair, driven by market conditions, trader behaviour or noise.   
  Figure 6 shows the one-step ahead forecasts of β1 and β2 (for the US dollar and 
the yen) at each iteration over the sample period 1990:1 to 2004:6 for the five Asian 
countries. As with the EMP indices, the crisis period is easy to detect for both the US 
dollar and the yen. The results lend weight to those of the previous section in that the 
won, baht, and rupiah are all seemingly less influenced by the US dollar after the crisis. 
                                                                                                                                             
 
17 The βs are assumed to follow a random walk and the covariance matrix of the measurement 
and the transition equation is diagonal. This is the usual practise (see Cuthbertson et al., 1992 
for a discussion).    18
For Korea and Thailand, the value of β1 is more volatile post crisis. Volatility of the 
coefficient values over time might possibly be interpreted as a loosening of the degree of 
influence of a particular currency over the local currency -- perhaps a reflection of a 
loosening of a peg to that currency. This is consistent with Kim and Lee (2004) who 
find that Thai and Korean interest rates have become less sensitive to US interest rates 
post crisis, suggesting greater flexibility of these currencies relative to the US dollar. 
As expected, the β1 coefficient for Malaysia is 1 after the crisis. Interestingly, the 
influence of the yen (β2) is more volatile after the crisis for Thailand and higher in value 
for Korea and Indonesia, but also more volatile, especially for Korea. The results for the 
Philippines accord to those in the last section. There appears to be little difference in the 
influence of the US dollar or the yen between the pre and post crisis periods.    
Figure 7 presents the time variation of β1 and β2 on the same graph for each 
country. It can be seen here that, in general, the influence of the US dollar has decreased 
after the crisis, but that the influence of the yen has increased. For Korea, there is a 
sizeable difference between the influence of the dollar and that of the yen before the 
crisis. After the crisis, there is evidence of convergence, as the coefficient for β1 has 
decreased and β2 increased. This is consistent with the conclusions drawn based on the 
EMP using Index 1, but not Index 2. The extent to which the baht is driven by the dollar 
is more erratic post crisis and is matched by the yen. This is in line with the conclusions 
in the previous section which suggest that the baht may have become more flexible vis-
à-vis both the yen and the US dollar post crisis. Indonesia’s coefficient for the US dollar 
is relatively smooth compared to the yen, suggesting a possible inclination to continue to 
fix to the US dollar. The comparative results for the Philippines show that while the 
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degree of influence of the US dollar may be high, it is not smooth. This is representative 
of a scenario where a high correlation does not necessarily imply a peg. The yen 
maintains a small influence over the Philippine peso. Needless to say, the results for 
Malaysia are as expected, the ringgit being influenced entirely by the US dollar post 
crisis. 
 
5. Concluding  Remarks 
  This paper has reviewed the pre and post crisis exchange rate regimes for Korea, 
Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. The de jure regimes for Korea, 
Thailand and Indonesia seem to suggest that exchange rates underwent a transition from 
soft US dollar pegs to floating exchange rates (cum inflation targeting) after the crisis.  
Malaysia’s regime reverted to a fully fixed exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar since 
September 1998. The Philippines, which was least impacted by the crisis, maintained its 
status as operating a ‘dirty’ floating exchange rate regime.  
  We return to our basic question posed in the Introduction -- Have the Asian 
countries (except Malaysia) moved to more flexible exchange rate regimes, or have they 
reverted to soft US dollar pegs post crisis? From the various measures of de facto 
regimes presented in this paper, it appears that there is definitely an increase in exchange 
rate flexibility after the crisis in the case of Thailand. There is some evidence of a 
possible reversion to a US dollar peg for Indonesia (also see Siregar and Rajan, 2003). 
The results for Korea are arguably most interesting in that they suggest that while there 
is still a significant and possibly increasing degree of influence by the US dollar on local 
currencies after the crisis, the influence of the yen has increased materially post crisis. 
However, the variability of this influence has also increased. As such, it is unclear   20
whether the Korean monetary authorities are consciously placing more weight to the yen 
in managing the Korean won as suggested by Taguchi (2004), or they have genuinely let 
the currency float and the market has caused a higher co-movement between local 
currencies and the yen. This is an area for future research
18.  
Going forward, in a world of generalized flexible exchange rates among the 
major currencies, there may be a case for Asian currencies to consider pegging to a 
basket of currencies (Bird and Rajan, 2002 and Rajan, 2002). By managing exchange 
rate changes against a composite bundle of currencies (that is, stabilizing the ‘effective’ 
exchange rate), countries may be able to buffer themselves against outside exchange rate 
shocks (such as G-3 currency variations) and neutralize this source of instability. Such a 
‘band-basket-crawl’ or BBC arrangement may not only be an attractive regime for 
countries that have embraced more flexibility post crisis like Korea and Thailand, but 
also US dollar 'fixers' in Asia like China, Hong Kong and Malaysia
19. Indonesia, which 
appears to have had difficulties with implementing an inflation targeting regime and may 
be reverting to a soft dollar peg, could also consider such a regime. While such an 
arrangement is no panacea against unsustainable macroeconomic policies and extreme 
external shocks, it may be a way of trading off the disciplinary and credibility benefits of 
a pegged regime with the flexibility of a floating one.  
                                                 
18 Eichengreen (2004) and Willett (2004) explore Korean exchange rate and monetary policies in 
some detail. However, neither specifically addresses or entangles the issue of the won-yen nexus. 
Also see Oh (2004). 
  
19 India and Singapore are two Asian countries that currently operate slightly different versions 
of the BBC. For discussions of the Singapore experience with managed floating, see Rajan and 
Siregar (2002) and Hoe Ee et al. (2004). For a discussion of Indian exchange rate policy, see 
Patnaik (2003).   21
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Table 1 
Highlights of Inflation Targeting Regimes in Selected Asian Countries 
 






Accountability  Target set by  Publication and 
accountability 
 




1-2 years  none  None, but 
parliament can 
request reports 
at any time 
Central Bank  Quarterly Inflation 
report,  
Annual report to 
public 




2 years  Yes, in the 







the nature of the 
breach and steps 
to address it 
Central Bank  Quarterly inflation 
report, publication 
of monetary policy 
meetings 
Thailand  Apr 2000  Core CPI 
(excluding food 
and energy) 
Indefinite None  Public 
explanation of 
breach and steps 









and publication of 
models used 









































  Pre Post Pre  Post Pre Post  Pre  Post Pre Post 
Indonesia 0.24  6.09  2.87  6.42  1.57  4.88  1.97 2.67  23.74  14.31 
Korea 0.79  2.29  2.69  2.89  1.15  1.48  1.28 0.10  7.81  21.51 
Philippines 2.24  2.17  3.82  3.11  2.33  2.05  5.68 0.60  11.83  7.23 
Thailand 0.50  2.11  2.57  3.01  1.08  1.37  2.26 0.25  10.61  5.79 
Average  0.94 3.17 2.99  3.86 1.53  2.45  2.80 0.91  13.50  12.21 
               
Malaysia 1.25  --  2.80  2.45  1.58  1.46  0.41  0.06  23.62  30.28 
               
Australia  2.06 3.25 3.67  3.63 2.10 2.08  0.32  0.15 5.79 9.13 
Canada  1.22 1.91 2.85  4.09 1.25 1.39  0.56  0.21 6.02 5.05 
New Zealand  1.57  3.55  3.20  2.94  1.43  2.15  0.71 0.16  43.43  22.63 
UK 3.25  2.29  3.87  2.86  1.76  1.22  0.64  0.82  10.77  3.46 
USA  --  --  2.87  2.45 1.64 1.78  0.18  0.21 1.25 0.38 
Average  2.03 2.75 3.29  3.19 1.64  1.73  0.48  0.31 13.45  8.13 
 
Source: IMF IFS and ADB-ARIC data, monthly observations. 
Notes:  Standard deviations for exchange rates are calculated from percentage first differences  
for interest rates, first differences and for net foreign assets,  the deviation from the HP 
Trend is taken and divided by lagged money base.   
Pre sample period: 1990:1 to 1997:3 











OLS Estimates using Frankel and Wei (1994) Method 
 
Equation: ERt = β0 + β1USt + β2JPt + μt   
 
 Korea  Thailand  Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines 
  Pre  Post Pre  Post Pre  Post Pre  Pre  Post 










































































adj  0.97  0.72 0.99  0.60 0.99  0.31 0.89  0.75  0.54 
DW  1.92  1.74 2.06  1.98 1.97  2.01 1.80  1.92  2.20 
Obs  87  61 87  61 97  61 87  87  61 
 
Notes: *(**)(†), 10% (5%)(1%) significant levels, respectively 
Malaysia post crisis regressions not included.  
Korea pre crisis results, Indonesia pre and post crisis results contained serial correlation. 
To correct for this, Korea pre crisis and Indonesia post crisis model includes ARMA(1,1) 







Figure 1: Exchange Rates, 1990-2004 
   Source: IMF IFS and ADB-ARIC. 
 
 
















































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2a: Standard Deviations of Local Exchange Rate Per US Dollar 
Source: IMF IFS. Calculated as calendar year standard deviations of percentage first differences 



















































































Figure 2b: Standard Deviations, Local Exchange Rate Per Yen 


















































































Figure 2c: Standard Deviations of REER 
 




















































































Figure 3: Standard Deviations of Interest Rates 

































































































































Source: IMF IFS. Calculated as annual standard deviation of monthly deviations of net foreign 

















































































Figure 5a – 5c: Flexibility Index 1 
 
 












































 Source: IMF IFS and ADB-ARIC 
 
 




















































































































Source: IMF IFS and ADB-ARIC 
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Figure 8: Kalman Filter Results 
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